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Abstract
This paper surveys models of markets in which some consumers are savvywhile
others are not. We discuss when the presence of savvy consumers improves the deals
available to non-savvy consumers in the market (the case of search externalities), and
when the non-savvy fund generous deals for savvy consumers (ripo¤ externalities).
We also discuss when the two groups of consumers have aligned or divergent views
about market interventions. The analysis covers two overlapping families of models:
those which examine markets with price/quality dispersion, and those which exhibit
forms of consumer hold-up.
Keywords: Consumer protection, consumer search, price dispersion, hold-up, add-
on pricing.
1 Introduction
This paper examines a number of situations in which savvyand non-savvyconsumers
interact in the marketplace. An old intuition in economics suggests that savvy consumers
help to protect other consumers, and that consumer policies which protect vulnerable
consumers are only needed when there are insu¢ cient numbers of savvy types present in the
market. In broad terms, a search externalityoperates so that those consumers who are
better informed about the deals available in the market ensure that less informed consumers
also obtain reasonable outcomes. Recent work, however, has examined situations where
savvy consumers benet from the presence of non-savvy types. In such markets, a ripo¤
externalityis present, and vulnerable consumers may need protection even when they are
small in number.
Department of Economics and All Souls College, University of Oxford. Versions of this paper were
presented to the 2013 Annual Meeting of German Economic Association in Düsseldorf and to the 2014
conference on Industrial Organization: theory, empirics and experiments organized by the University of
Salento. I am grateful for discussions on this topic to Kyle Bagwell, Renaud Foucart, Rani Spiegler, John
Vickers, and Jidong Zhou.
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This paper discusses three principal issues. First, what kinds of inter-consumer exter-
nalities are present? That is, when do savvy consumers protect other consumers, when do
non-savvy consumers improve the deals o¤ered to the savvy, or when is there no interaction
between the two groups at all? Second, which kinds of market intervention benet both
consumer groups and which policies benet one group at the expense of the other? Third
and nally, what determines the extent of savviness in the consumer population?
For our purposes, there are two broad notions of savviness to consider. First, a consumer
might be well informed about the prices and/or product qualities available in the market.
For instance, a savvy consumer shopping for wine is able to determine the likely quality
of the wine inside by looking at the label. Alternatively, a consumer looking for a new
television may know the range of available prices (e.g., because she is online), or knows how
much she is willing to pay for a product before travelling to the seller. Second, a consumer
might be strategically savvy, in that she has a good understanding of the game being played
in the market. For instance, consumers might be unable to discern product quality (i.e.,
they are non-savvy in the rst sense) but they understand how quality depends on price in
equilibrium and buy accordingly. Or they might foresee a rms incentive to set its future
prices. A consumer who is savvy in this sense is aware of her future behaviour, while a
strategically naive consumer might not predict accurately how she will behave.
A consumer might be non-savvy in both senses. For instance, she might not be able to
discern quality and also might not foresee how quality depends on price. Indeed, strategic
naivety might be the cause of information problems. For instance, in a market where in
fact there is price dispersion, but naive consumers think that all sellers o¤er the same price,
a naive consumer might choose not to incur search costs to become informed about the
prices in the market.
A useful framework for discussing the issues is the following.1 Suppose there are two
kinds of consumers, savvyand non-savvy, and the proportion of savvy consumers in
the population is . To focus on the impact of savviness on outcomes, we suppose that
there are no systematic di¤erences in tastes for the product in question across the two
groups of consumers. Except for section 2.2, we take the extent of savviness, , to be
exogenous and out of the control of consumers and rms.
Let VS() and VN() denote the expected net surplus enjoyed in equilibrium by an
1See also Armstrong (2008, section III.C) and Armstrong and Vickers (2012, section 3).
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individual savvy and non-savvy consumer respectively, while V ()  VS()+(1 )VN()
measures aggregate consumer surplus. We expect that VS()  VN(), so that savvy
consumers obtain better deals than their non-savvy counterparts.2 This is because tastes
do not di¤er across the two groups of consumer, and a savvy type could mimic a non-savvy
buying strategy and so obtain surplus VN . A rational, but uninformed, buyer must obtain
non-negative surplus VN  0, for otherwise she would choose to stay out of the market.
However, a strategically naive consumer might experience negative surplus. In many cases
VS and VN move the same way with  i.e., either both increase with , both decrease
with , or neither depends on  although it is not inevitable this be so.3
Likewise, let S() and N() denote the prot generated in equilibrium by an indi-
vidual savvy and non-savvy consumer respectively, while ()  S() + (1  )N()
measures industry prot. Here, it is less clear how S and N compare, although in most
of the situations discussed in this paper non-savvy consumers generate more prot than
the savvy and S()  N(). In perfectly competitive situations, we expect all prots
to be zero. Finally, let W ()  V () + () denote total welfare.
There are (at least) three cases of interest:
Search externalities: When savvy consumers exert a positive externality on the non-
savvy that is, when VN() increases with  we say that search externalities are
present. This is because the leading example where savvy consumers protect non-savvy
consumers is when the former are better informed about prices or qualities available in the
market, and when there are more consumers aware of all the available deals this makes
suppliers o¤er good deals, which in turn are available to more inert buyers.4 As we will see,
within this class of markets, VS usually also increases with , while overall welfare W can
increase or decrease with  and prots  might increase, decrease or be hump-shaped
in , depending on the context.
Ripo¤ externalities: When savvy consumers benet from the presence of the non-savvy
2However, there are situations in which replacing a population of savvy buyers with a population of
non-savvy buyers will make buyers better o¤. For instance, this is the case in one of the hold-up scenarios
discussed in section 3.1. There are also cases where the two kinds of consumer obtain exactly the same
surplus; for example, this is often the case when a monopolist o¤ers a single product at a single price and
so all consumers obtain the same deal.
3For instance, in section 2.3 the surplus enjoyed by savvy consumers can be a non-monotonic function
of , although non-savvy surplus increases with . Likewise, in the model of bill shockin section 3.2, it
is possible that VN increases with  while VS decreases with .
4At the time of writing this, the front-page headline of the UKs Daily Telegraph on 9 July 2014 was
Savvy shoppers force down prices.
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when VS() decreases with  we say ripo¤ externalitiesare present. A leading example
of this situation is when non-savvy consumers can be ripped o¤with extra charges, and
the resulting revenue is passed back to all consumers in the form of subsidized headline
price. Another example of such a market (not discussed further in this paper) is Akerlof
(1970)s lemons market, where savvy consumers who understand adverse selection can
cause the market to shut down. Strategically naive consumers, however, who mistakenly
believe the pool of products o¤ered for sale is una¤ected by the selling price and who
may therefore pay more than the product is really worth to them can allow the market to
open.5 In markets with ripo¤ externalities, it is possible that aggregate consumer surplus
V rises with , even if both VS and VN fall with , if the gap VS   VN is large.
No interactions between consumers: On the knife edge between these two cases are situ-
ations in which there is no interaction between the two groups of consumers, and VS and
VN do not depend on . These cases typically involve biased beliefs on the part of naive
consumers. If present, competition delivers what each type of consumer thinks they want,
and neither wishes to choose the deal o¤ered to the other type. Ex post, though, biassed
consumers might regret the deal they chose. (A lucky charm which is sold to help predict
winning lottery numbers, say, has no impact on the savvy consumers who do not buy it,
but may be attractive ex ante to naive consumers.)
The plan for the rest of this paper is as follows. Oligopoly models which generate
price or quality dispersion are examined in section 2, and we will see that the search
externality tends to operate in such markets, so that savvy types confer a benet to the
non-savvy (and usually to other savvy types too). Models with various forms of hold-up
are presented in section 3, including situations with both an indivisible good and with a
more complex product involving add-on services.6 In these markets a richer set of outcomes
are possible, and seemingly minor variants of the add-on price problem generate each of
the three situations search externalities, ripo¤ externalities, and no interaction listed
above. We end the paper with some concluding comments.
5See Spiegler (2011, section 8.3) and the references listed there for further discussion of markets when
consumers have limited understanding of adverse selection.
6There is some overlap in the two classes of model. The model of quality dispersion in section 2.4 could
logically t under either heading, and one of the add-on models in section 3.2 involves price dispersion.
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2 Price and Quality Dispersion
2.1 A model of price dispersion
In a market for an indivisible good of known quality, it is intuitive that when some con-
sumers are aware of available prices and buy from the cheapest supplier, those who shop
less diligently are partially protected.
To illustrate this, consider Varian (1980)s classical model of price dispersion.7 Here,
n identical rms supply a homogeneous product with unit cost c. In general, consumers
di¤er in their reservation value for the item, v, where the fraction of consumers with v  p
is denoted q(p). For ease of notation, write (p)  (p c)q(p) for prot with price p, which
we assume is quasi-concave in p, and pM for the price which maximizes this prot. An
exogenous fraction  of consumers (independent of the valuation v) are savvy, in the sense
that they buy from the cheapest supplier, while other 1  consumers buy from a random
supplier so long as that suppliers price is below their v.8
In cases where all consumers are savvy or all are non-savvy, there is a pure strategy
equilibrium and no price dispersion. If  = 1, so that all consumers shop around, there is
Bertrand competition and price is driven down to cost c. If  = 0, so that all consumers
shop randomly, then no supplier has an incentive to set price below the monopoly price
pM , and the outcome is as if a single rm supplied the market. Since there is no price
dispersion, it follows that VN = VS and N = S in these extreme cases. (Here, V and
 refer to the expected value of a consumers surplus and prot, with expectations taken
over the idiosyncratic valuation v.)
However, in a mixed market with 0 <  < 1, the only (static) equilibrium involves a
mixed strategy for prices, so there is price dispersion in the market and a savvy consumer
obtains a (weakly) lower price than any non-savvy consumer. It follows that VS > VN and
S < N . In more detail, the symmetric equilibrium involves each rm choosing its price
according to a cumulative distribution function (CDF) F (p), which satises
(1  F (p))n 1 + 1
n
(1  ) (p)  1
n
(1  )(pM) : (1)
7See Salop and Stiglitz (1977) for closely related analysis.
8This behaviour could be justied if each consumers cost of search is very convex, in the sense that a
consumer can visit one supplier for free but nds it too costly ever to visit a second supplier. A fraction
 are informed of each rms price, while the remaining 1    consumers are informed of no price. An
alternative interpretation of this inert behaviour is that 1    consumers are strategically naive, and
mistakenly think that competition operates so that the law of one priceoperates and all sellers o¤er the
same price.
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Here, a rm which chooses price p will sell to all  savvy consumers (who have v  p)
provided all of its rivals choose a higher price, which occurs with probability (1 F (p))n 1
in this equilibrium. On the other hand, the rm will always sell to its share of the 1  inert
consumers (who have v  p). As such, a rms demand from the uninformed consumers is
less elastic than demand from the informed. The left-hand side of (1) is therefore the sellers
prot if it sets price p. Since the seller could decide only to serve its captive consumers,
who are 1
n
(1   ) in number, with the monopoly price, the right-hand side represents a
sellers available prot.9 For a rm to be willing to play the mixed strategy F (), the rm
must be indi¤erent between all prices in the support of F ().
The value of F (p) which solves (1) is an increasing function of . That is, when the
fraction of savvy consumers is higher, each seller is more likely to set low prices. Intuitively,
increasing  makes a sellers demand more elastic. Because each sellers price distribution
is shifted downwards (in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance) when  rises, both
the savvy consumers (who pay the minimum price from n draws) and the inert consumers
(who pay the price from a single draw) are better o¤ when  is higher. In the notation of
section 1, then, VS and VN increase with , as does aggregate consumer surplus. From (1),
industry prot is () = (1  )(pM), which decreases with . Total welfare W at least
weakly increases with  since lower prices stimulate demand.
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Figure 1: Expected surplus with price dispersion (n = 2 and n = 4)
9However, it is not an equilibrium for sellers to choose the monopoly price p = pM for sure, since a
seller could slightly undercut this price and thereby serve all the savvy consumers.
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Figure 1 depicts the net surpluses VS and VN enjoyed by the savvy (the upper solid
curve) and the inert (lower solid curve) consumers when all consumers are willing to pay
v = 1 for the item and c = 0, so that (p) = p if p  1, and when n = 2. Note that
the extent of price dispersion, as captured by the gap between the minimum and average
price in the market, is non-monotonic in . (As discussed, there is no price dispersion
when  = 0 or  = 1.) As such, increasing  might increase or decrease the extent of price
dispersion in a market, depending on the initial level of savviness.10
The two solid curves on Figure 1 are rather close together, indicating there is a limited
benet to a consumer in knowing both prices. When the number of suppliers is larger,
however, one can show that the expected price paid by savvy consumers falls while the
expected price paid by the inert shoppers rises, so the two curves on Figure 1 move further
apart. Intuitively, a rms demand from the savvy consumers, (1   F )n 1, falls with n
faster than its demand from the inert, (1   )=n, and so with larger n a rm puts more
weight on extracting revenue from the latter group. (One can see that the prices paid by
informed and uninformed consumers must move in opposite directions as n increases, since
industry prot () = (1 )(pM) does not depend on n.) The dashed lines on the gure
show the respective surplus functions in this example when n = 4. Thus, increasing the
number of suppliers has contrasting e¤ects on the informed and the uninformed consumers,
with only the savvy benetting from more competitionof this form.11
Extension to this benchmark model:
Amodication to the above model allows suppliers to charge distinct prices to savvy and
inert consumers. For example, the former group might be those who use a price-comparison
website and buy online, while the uninformed go to a random bricks-and-mortar store, and
a supplier might set di¤erent prices for the two purchase channels. When this form of
price discrimination is used, the link between the two groups is broken, and the outcome
is that the informed consumers are o¤ered a low price equal to marginal cost c, while the
uninformed are charged the monopoly price pM . In this case, there is no search externality
and the fraction of informed consumers has no impact on the surplus of either group.12
10Brown and Goolsbee (2002) nd evidence consistent with this, when they observe that price dispersion
rises when the use of price comparison websites increases from a low level, then decreases as their use
becomes more widespread.
11See Morgan, Orzen, and Sefton (2006) for further discussion of the impact of changing  and n on
payo¤s to consumers. These authors also conduct an experiment, where human sellers face computer
consumers, and which conrms the models predictions quite closely.
12Baye and Morgan (2002) consider a model in which sellers must pay to list on a price comparison
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A second variant of Varians model extends the analysis to a dynamic setting, and
examines the impact of consumer savviness on the sustainability of tacit collusion in this
market.13 Suppose the industry attempts to collude at the monopoly price pM with the use
of a trigger strategy. If a rm deviates by undercutting pM , suppose this is detected by all
rivals, and from the next period onwards the industry plays the one-shot Nash equilibrium
with mixed strategies described above, yielding per-rm prots in each period given by
the right-hand side of (1). If a rm does undercut the collusive price, this lower price
is observed only by the  savvy consumers. As a result, when  is the discount factor,
collusion at the monopoly price can be sustained if
1
1  
(pM)
n| {z }
collusive prot
 ( + 1  
n
)(pM)| {z }
deviation prot
+

1   (1  )
(pM)
n| {z }
punishment prot
which reduces to the usual condition
  n  1
n
:
In this market, increasing  has two contrasting e¤ects. When  is large there is erce
competition without collusion, and so the punishment prots are small. On the other
hand, when  is large, the number of consumers who respond to a price cut is large, and
so short-run gains from deviating are large. These two e¤ects precisely cancel out, and the
ability to collude is una¤ected by the number of savvy consumers.
A nal variant considers a situation in which, instead of purchasing from a random
seller, a sales intermediary (or salesmanfor brevity) steers the inert consumers towards
a supplier of his choice, if given incentive by that supplier to do so. These naive consumers
follow sales advice, without understanding that the advice might be biassed by nancial
inducements from sellers.14
website, and can charge di¤erent prices on this website and when they sell direct to consumers. They nd
that sellers choose whether to list according to a mixed strategy and choose their price on the comparison
website according to a mixed strategy, and obtain positive prots there generated by the possibility they
are the sole listing seller. The price on the comparison website is lower than its price on its own platform.
13See Schultz (2005) for this analysis, as well as its extension to a market with horizontally di¤erentiated
products. Petrikaite (2014) analyzes an alternative model in which consumers can become informed about
prices and valuations by incurring a search cost. She nds that in an increase in this search cost i.e., a
reduction in market transparency makes collusion easier to achieve.
14Inderst and Ottaviani (2012, page 502) report how a majority of people who had received nancial
advice believed that advice to be independent, and only a minority believed that commissions were being
paid to their advisor.
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In more detail Armstrong and Zhou (2011, section 1) suppose that a number of sym-
metric suppliers costlessly supply a homogenous product which all consumers value at v.
This product is only available via a consultation with a salesman. An exogenous frac-
tion  of savvy consumers are immune to the salesmans patter, costlessly observe the full
list of retail prices, and buy from the cheapest supplier. The remaining fraction 1   
of consumers are susceptible to the marketing e¤orts of the salesman and follow his rec-
ommendation. Suppose that a supplier chooses its retail price, p, and commission rate, b,
simultaneously (and simultaneously with its rivals). In this setting a salesman will promote
the highest-commission product (regardless of how retail prices compare).
When  = 1, so that all consumers are savvy, there is no point in a seller spending re-
sources to inuence a salesman, and the result is Bertrand price competition, and suppliers
and salesmen obtain no prots. When  = 0, the salesman determines demand entirely,
and so suppliers compete to o¤er the highest commission. The result is that both the retail
price and the commission payment is driven up to v, so that suppliers obtain zero prot
but salesmen extract the entire social surplus. In either case, there is no price dispersion.
When 0 <  < 1 sellers choose their retail prices and commission payments randomly.
In equilibrium, there is an increasing relationship between a rms choice of b and p. This is
because a higher price p makes it more worthwhile for a seller to pay the salesman to steer
the uninformed consumers towards its product. Since high commissions are associated
with high retail prices, there is mis-selling, and a salesman promotes the more expensive
product due to the higher commission he receives. The expected outlay for a non-savvy
consumer is the expected value of the highest of the retail prices in the market, rather than
the the expected value of a random price in the market as in Varians model.
In the case with two suppliers, Armstrong and Zhou (2011) show there is a linear
relationship between a suppliers price and its commission. Specically, the lowest retail
price a supplier o¤ers is pmin = (1 )v, and if a supplier chooses retail price p it will o¤er
a salesman the commission payment
b(p) =
1  

(p  pmin) :
As in Varians original model, one can show that the surpluses of savvy and non-savvy
consumers increase with , while the total prots of suppliers and salesmen combined
decreases with .
Using this model one can consider the impact of a policy which restricts the use of
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commission payments. Suppose that salesmen remain necessary for consumers to buy the
product, but commission payments are banned and a salesman is instead paid directly for a
consultation by consumers. Competition between salesmen implies that their consultation
charge is zero. Suppose that when a salesman receives no commissions, he steers the naive
consumers to the cheaper product. (This might be because, all else equal, he has a small
intrinsic preference for assigning the appropriate product to consumers.) In this case, all
consumers buy the cheaper product and in Bertrand fashion the sellers are forced to set
their retail prices equal to cost. It follows that both groups of consumers are better o¤ in
the no-commission regime (although salesmen and suppliers are worse o¤).15
2.2 The equilibrium number of savvy consumers
When consumers choose to be savvy
When information about market conditions and product attributes is costly to acquire,
it may be rational to stay uninformed, especially when the search externality is present
and most other consumers are already well informed.16 To discuss the equilibrium extent
of savviness, continue with the model of price dispersion from the previous section, and
when the fraction of savvy types is  write a savvy consumers surplus as VS() and the
surplus of an uninformed consumer as VN(). (The following argument is easiest if we
assume all consumers have the same value v for the product, so that all consumers will
buy in equilibrium.) As illustrated on Figure 1, VS and VN increase with , and where the
incentive to become informed, VS() VN(), is hump-shapedsuch that VS(0) VN(0) =
VS(1)  VN(1) = 0.
Suppose that consumers can switch from being ignorant to informed by incurring an
information acquisition cost, . In general, consumers may di¤er in their cost of acquiring
information, and let () be the corresponding cost of the marginal consumer when 
consumers choose to become informed. A consumer with information acquisition cost 
will choose to become informed if and only if   VS()   VN(), and consumers will
choose to become informed until the marginal consumer is indi¤erent. Thus, the fraction
15Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) present an alternative model of mis-selling, where the salesman advises
consumers about the suitability of a product rather than its price. There, no consumers are informed, and
must rely on the salesman to advise them about which product to buy. The salesman has only a noisy signal
about the suitability of a product, and he has an intrinsic preference to recommend the suitable product
to a consumer. However, this preference can be overturned if a seller sets a high enough commission.
16The issue of how many agents rationally decide to remain uninformed in a market equilibrium was
highlighted early on by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Burdett and Judd (1983).
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 of consumers who become informed in an interior equilibrium with 0 <  < 1 satises
VS()  VN() = () : (2)
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibria, where the hump-shaped curve, VS()  VN(), cap-
tures the benet of being informed, while the upward-sloping line () represents the cost
of becoming informed. The gure shows there are two interior equilibria satisfying (8), a
low- and a high- equilibrium. However, only the high- equilibrium is stable, while at
the low- equilibrium a perturbation in  will induce  to move away from this point. As
emphasized by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) in a related model, it is never an equilibrium
for all consumers to become informed. In any interior equilibrium, because of the search
externality too few consumers choose to be informed and too many prefer to free-ride
on other consumerssearch e¤orts and aggregate consumer surplus would be boosted if
 were locally increased.17 (By contrast, if the market instead had a ripo¤ externality, in
the sense that aggregate consumer surplus was a decreasing function of , there would be
excessive numbers of consumers choosing to be savvy.)
sigma
Figure 2: The fraction of consumers who choose to be informed
If (0) > 0, as depicted on the gure, there is a second stable equilibrium where
 = 0. When no one becomes informed, all consumers obtain the same (bad) deal in
17Formally, aggregate consumer surplus when  consumers incur the cost of being informed is
VS() + (1  )VN () 
Z 
0
(~)d~
which is strictly increasing in  at any point satisfying (2).
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the market, and there is no point investing in acquiring information to nd a better deal.
This equilibrium is akin to Diamond (1971)s paradox. However, if a fraction of consumer
actively enjoy shopping, so that () = 0 for su¢ ciently all small , the unique equilibrium
may be the high- equilibrium.
One can imagine consumer policies which a¤ect either the cost curve or the benet
curve. Assuming that it is the high- equilibrium which is relevant, a policy which reduces
information acquisition costs in the sense of shifting the curve () downwards will
increase , and this will in turn benet all consumers. Likewise, a policy which shifts
the benet curve upwards will increase equilibrium . For example, in the model of price
dispersion in section 2.1, we saw on Figure 1 that increasing the number of suppliers pushed
the surplus of the two groups of consumers further apart, and so shifted the benet curve
upwards. Since this will increase , it may be that increasing the number of suppliers will
in equilibrium benet all consumers once the impact on  is taken into account.18
On the other hand, a policy which shifts the benet curve downwards will reduce the
fraction of consumers who choose to become informed.19 Consider the model of price dis-
persion discussed in section 2.1, specialized to the case with two sellers, consumer valuation
v = 1 and costless production as depicted on Figure 1. Suppose that any consumer can
become informed of both prices, rather than having to shop randomly, by incurring the
cost  = 1
20
. In this case, a fraction   0:95 of consumers choose to be informed and all
consumers have expected outlay (including information costs where relevant) of about 0:1.
In this example most consumers obtain what seems like a good deal, obtaining the item
in return for an outlay which is only 10% of their valuation. However, a few consumers
will pay up to ten times this price, and pressure from the media, politicians, or consumer
groups to protect consumers from these occasional high prices could arise. Suppose in
response that a new policy constrains rms to set prices no higher than 1
2
, so that the max-
imum permitted price is halved. For a given , the expected prices paid by the informed
and uninformed consumers then halve, and hence the incentive to become informed also
18To take an extreme example, if all consumers have information acquisition cost  = 110 , then by exam-
ining Figure 1 we see that the only equilibrium with duopoly involves no consumers becoming informed,
in which case all consumers are charged the monopoly price p = 1. However, with four suppliers, the
maximum gap between VS and VN is greater than , and a stable equilibrium with   1 emerges where
all consumers have total outlay of about  = 110 . A contrasting e¤ect is discussed in Spiegler (2011, page
150). When a consumer is faced with a greater number of suppliers, she may su¤er from choice overload,
with the result that fewer consumers are savvy.
19See Fershtman and Fishman (1994) and Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) for analysis of this issue.
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halves. The result is that the fraction of informed consumers falls to   0:74, so that
the number of uninformed consumers rises about 5-fold as a result of the policy. Each
consumer now has expected outlay of about 0:17, which is 70% higher than in the absence
of the price cap. Industry prot more than doubles as a result of the imposition of the price
cap. Thus, the perverse e¤ect of this well-intentioned consumer policy can be substantial.20
When rms confuse consumers
The previous section discussed how consumers can take the initiative to become savvy.
Clearly, rms also play role in suppling information to consumers, and there is a vast
economic literature about how rms advertise their products and prices. Less familiar is
the possibility that the rms attempt to confuse consumers, with the result that the
fraction of savvy types falls. For example, rms might present their prices in an opaque
way or in a di¤erent format to their rivals, and this makes it hard for some consumers to
compare deals.21
To illustrate this possibility, consider the following extension to the price dispersion
model of section 2.1.22 There are two rms, and a rm can present its price in one of two
formats. If rms choose the same format, consumers nd it easy to compare prices and all
choose to buy from the rm with the lower price. However, if rms choose distinct formats
a fraction 1   of consumers are confused and buy randomly (while the remaining  are
savvy enough to make an accurate comparison even across formats).
In this context, rms choose both prices and formats according to a mixed strategy.
Since the format itself does not matter, only whether the formats are the same or not, a
rm chooses the same CDF for its price, say F (p), regardless of its chosen format, and is
equally likely to choose either format. If one rm chooses a particular format and price p,
20Knittel and Stango (2003) examine the credit card market in the United States in the period 197989,
during which usury laws in some states put a ceiling on permitted interest rates. In their Table 3 they
show how, for much of this period, average interest rates were higher in those states with a ceiling, and
interpret this as evidence that price caps can encourage tacit collusion via a policy-induced focal point.
The (static) search model presented in the text provides an alternative explanation for why a price cap
might lead to price rises.
21For instance, Clerides and Courty (2013) observe empirically that the same brand of detergent is sold
in two sizes, the large size containing twice as much as the smaller. Sometimes the large size is more than
twice as expensive as the smaller, and yet signicant numbers of consumers still buy it.
22This discussion is based on Piccione and Spiegler (2012) and Chioveanu and Zhou (2013).
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then as in expression (1) its expected prot is0@1
2
[1  F (p)]| {z }
same format
+ 1
2
[(1  F (p)) + 1
2
(1  )]| {z }
di¤erent format
1A (p  c)  1
4
(1  )(v   c) :
Here, if the two rms display their prices in the same format there is erce competition,
and the cheaper rm wins the whole market, while if the formats di¤er a fraction (1 ) of
consumer shop randomly. The right-hand side of the above represents the prot obtained
when a rm happens to have a di¤erent format and fully exploits its captive consumers,
which is each rms equilibrium expected prot.
It is not an equilibrium for rms to choose their format deterministically. Clearly, if
both rms were known to choose the same format, price would be driven down to cost and
prot to zero. In that case, a rm could switch format to make money from the newly
confused consumers. If both rms were known to choose distinct formats, prices would be
chosen according to a mixed strategy as in (1). However, in that case, a rm could switch
to o¤er the same format as its rival and o¤er the lowest price in the price support, which
ensures it serves the entire market and boosts its prot.
This model predicts that rms engage in tari¤ di¤erentiationto obtain positive prof-
its, just as rms in more traditional oligopoly models engage in product di¤erentiation.
However, unlike forms of product di¤erentiation, this tari¤ di¤erentiation confers no wel-
fare gains. A consumer policy which forced rms to present prices in a common format
would, in this model, move the market to Bertrand price competition, and all consumers
would benet.23
2.3 Coasian pricing
Consider next a very di¤erent kind of model, the durable goods problem of Coase (1972).
There, a rm sells its product over time to forward-looking consumers with heterogeneous
tastes for a single unit of its product. The rm cannot commit to its future prices, and after
high-value consumers have purchased, the rm has an incentive to reduce its price to sell
to remaining lower-value consumers. This model can be viewed as an oligopoly market
where the rm competes with itself over time with inter-temporal price dispersion.
23Additional features play a role when the two formats are simpleand opaque, and when both rms
choose an opaque format even more consumers are confused relative to when rms choose distinct formats.
In such a setting, when a rm sets a low price it chooses a simple format to make it easy for customers to
see its low price, but with a high price it o¤ers an opaque format.
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(However, in contrast to the previous model, here price dispersion does not arise through
the use of mixed strategies.)
We extend this classical model to allow a fraction 1    of consumers to be naive,
in the sense that they do not understand the rms incentive to reduce its price over
time.24 As such, these naive consumers buy myopically, as soon as the price falls below
their valuation for the item. It follows that VN  VS since naive consumers buy too
soon relative to the optimal purchasing strategy followed by the savvy, and since the rm
obtains greater prot when a consumer buys more quickly we have N  S. From this
perspective, naive consumers here are like the inert shoppers in Varians model (who can
be interpreted as mistakenly believing that all rms o¤er the same price). The presence
of these consumers tends to relax intra-rmcompetition in Coases model, just as they
relax inter-rm competition in Varians model, with the result that naive consumers are
protected by the presence of the savvy, while prots are harmed. However, in this market
savvy consumers might exert their search externality by following an ine¢ cient strategy,
which is to delay their purchase, and this makes the welfare impact of savvy consumers
less clear-cut than it was in section 2.1.
To illustrate these points, consider a simple example. A rm with costless production
sells its product over innite discrete time. All consumers are present from the start and
wish to have one unit of the product. There is a binary distribution for consumer valuations:
with probability  a consumer has high valuation vH and with probability 1    she has
lower valuation vL. Suppose that
vH  vL ; (3)
so in a one-period setting the rm prefers to sell only to the high-value consumers than
to all consumers. The rm and consumers have discount factor   1. A fraction  of
consumers are savvy and foresee the rms incentive to reduce its price over time, while
the remaining consumers are naive and mistakenly believe the rms price will not change
and so decide whether to purchase in the initial period myopically.
As soon as all high-value consumers have purchased, the rm will set price p = vL
and sell to the low-value consumers. The price p which just induces the savvy high-value
24For example, when Apples iPhone was launched in 2007, many early buyers complained when the
price fell by $200 two months after the launch. These consumers might be classied as naive, although
in this instance they were so vociferous that the company o¤ered them a $100 voucher as compensation.
See the New York Times article (September 7, 2007) titled iPhone owners crying foul over price cut.
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consumers to buy now, anticipating that the price will fall to vL next period, satises
vH   p = (vH   vL), so that
p = vM  vL + (1  )vH
is intermediate between the high and low valuations.
One can show that the three strategies the rm might follow are:
Strategy 1: Set high initial price p1 = vH , then medium price p2 = vM , then low price
p3 = vL.
Strategy 1 involves setting a high price to high-value naive consumers which is not
attractive to savvy high-value consumers who anticipate a lower price later. The rm then
sets a medium price which is attractive to high-value savvy consumers, and nally sets
a low price to mop up all low-value demand. In particular, even though valuations are
binary, the rm o¤ers three distinct prices. This strategy generates total discounted prot
of (1  )vH + vM + 2(1  )vL, or
(1  (1   + 2))vH + 2(1   + )vL : (4)
These prots decrease with . When this strategy is used, the naives observe in period 2
that the rm does reduce its price over time, and so might be converted to savvy types.
However, by that point the high-value consumers have purchased, and the remaining low-
value consumers do not change their behaviour if they do become savvy.25
Strategy 2: Set high initial price p1 = vH then low price p2 = vL.
This strategy yields prots of
(1  )vH + ( + (1  )(1  ))vL (5)
25One advantage of this model is that the naive consumers need be naive only in the initial period,
and it makes no di¤erence to the analysis if their eyes are openedafter the initial period and they are
then converted into savvy types. Besanko and Winston (1990) analyze a related model in which consumer
valuations are continuously and uniformly distributed and there is a nite time horizon. They compare
the most protable price path when all consumers are forward looking to that when all consumers are non-
strategic and buy myopically. They show that the rm chooses a higher initial price with myopic consumers,
but the comparison between the nal prices is ambiguous. However, if one solves their model with an innite
horizon it seems that the price path for the strategic consumers is uniformly below that for the naive. For
instance, if valuations are uniformly distributed on [0; 1], production is costless and the discount factor is
 < 1, the equilibrium price with naive consumers in period t = 1; 2; :: is pt = (1 +
p
1  ) t, while the
price with strategic consumers is pt =
p
1    (1 +p1  ) t. However, it is perhaps implausible that
naive consumers continue to be surprised by price reductions after they have seen the rm reduce its price
already.
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which also decreases with . Strategy 1 yields greater prot than strategy 2 if and only if
(vH   vL)  (1  )vL : (6)
Given assumption (3), this condition is satised if and only if  is large enough.
Strategy 3: Set medium initial price p1 = vM then low price p2 = vL.
When the rm chooses to start with the medium price vM it will sell to all high-value
consumers immediately. The discounted prots with this strategy are vM + (1   )vL,
or
(1  )vH + vL ; (7)
which do not depend on . Condition (3) implies that this prot is higher than vL, which
is the prot if the rm initially charged the low price vL. Thus there is no need to consider
a fourth strategy to sell to all consumers immediately.
A low-value consumer obtains zero surplus in any event. A high-value consumer is worst
o¤ when strategy 1 is used, and best o¤ with strategy 3. (High-value naive consumers are
indi¤erent between strategies 1 and 2, while high-value savvy types are indi¤erent between
strategies 2 and 3.) Except when strategy 3 is followed, naive consumers obtain lower
surplus than savvy types, since they are too inclined to buy in the rst period compared
with the optimal purchasing strategy followed by savvy consumers. All else equal, total
welfare is also lowest with strategy 1 and highest with strategy 3.26
The rm makes lower prots when the fraction of savvy types is higher. (Its prot is
the maximum of the three functions (4), (5) and (7), all of which weakly decrease with .)
When   0, so almost all consumers are naive, strategy 2 is the most protable, while
when   1 strategy 3 is the most protable. It follows that strategy 1 can be optimal
only with a mixed population of naive and savvy consumers. Clearly, consumers are better
o¤ when almost all consumers are savvy compared when almost all are naive.
As we move from  = 0 to  = 1, it may be that strategy 1 is never followed.27 In this
case, strategy 3 is used if and only if  is large enough, and each consumers surplus is an
26Provided that the sellers strategy does not change, total welfare weakly decreases with . In each of
the three strategies, a low-value consumer buys at the same time regardless of whether they are naive or
savvy. However, a high-value consumer buys earlier if she is naive than if she is savvy, and this is good
for overall welfare. (With strategy 3, all high value consumers buy in the rst period and welfare does not
depend on .)
27The condition for this is (vH   vL)(vH   vL) < (1   )(1   )vLvH , which does not depend on .
This condition is satised if vH  vL but violated when  is close to 1.
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increasing function of . However, in other cases we move from strategy 2 to strategy 3
via strategy 1.28 Here, savvy consumers are worst o¤when  lies in an intermediate range,
and their net surplus is U -shapedin . Regardless of whether strategy 1 is sometimes
used, though, naive consumers who are indi¤erent between strategies 1 and 2 are always
weakly better o¤ as  increases. As such, this market exhibits search externalities in the
classication used in section 1.
In this framework, total welfare is U -shaped in . Welfare is the same when  = 0 as
when  = 1, since in either case all high-value consumers buy in period 1 and all low-value
consumers buy in period 2. However, for intermediate values of  strictly fewer high-value
consumers buy in the rst period when strategy 1 or 2 is followed.
2.4 Quality dispersion
Consider next the supply of a more complicated product with endogenous quality. We can
interpret quality quite broadly to include add-on charges and other small-print terms.
For instance, a seller of insurance may advertise a headline premium, while details about
excesses and exclusions are more hidden or hard for some consumers to interpret. Or a
snack could be made expensively using good ingredients or made cheaply by using lots of
salt, but only a fraction of consumers know how to interpret the list of ingredients.
Specically, suppose that n  2 symmetric rms serve a market. Each rm chooses
the price, p, and the quality, q, of its product. All consumers observe the prices from
all rms. However, only a fraction  of savvy consumers also observe all qualities, while
the remaining 1    see no rms quality. The less informed consumers are Bayesian,
and calculate a rms equilibrium incentives to choose quality. All consumers have the
same preferences, and their surplus from a product with price p and quality q is q   p.
We assume consumers are risk-neutral (and in particular, they care about the expected
quality of the product if they do not observe quality directly), and their outside option is
zero. If a rm chooses quality q, its unit cost of supply is c(q), which is a convex function
with c(0) = c0(0) = 0. Each rm chooses its price-quality pair (p; q) simultaneously, and
simultaneously with its rivals.
28For example, with parameter values  = 12 , vL = 1, vH = 4 and  =
2
3 (so that vM = 2), one can
check that when  < 13 the rm follows strategy 2, and sets initial price p1 = 4 followed by p2 = 1. For
intermediate 13 <  <
2
3 , the rm follows strategy 1, and sets initial price p1 = 4, then medium price
p2 = 2, then low price p3 = 1. For  > 23 , the rm starts with the medium price p1 = 2 and then drops its
price to p2 = 1.
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In the extreme cases when  = 0 or  = 1 the outcome involves pure strategies and
zero prots. If  = 0, no consumer observes quality and so there is no incentive for a rm
supply positive quality, although competition forces rms to set price equal to marginal
cost, so that p = q = 0. If  = 1, each rm maximizes consumer surplus q   p subject
to its break-even constraint p  c(q), so the e¢ cient quality which maximizes q   c(q) is
chosen and price again just covers cost.
However, when 0 <  < 1 there is no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. To see
this, suppose that all rms choose (p; q) and share the market equally. First, note that
p = q = 0 is not an equilibrium, since a rm can deviate and o¤er a higher-quality product
at a positive price, sell to savvy consumers, and make a positive prot. Therefore, assume
that p; q > 0. Then for a rm to have no incentive to cheat (i.e., o¤er ~q = 0) and serve
only its share of the non-savvy we require
1
n
(p  c(q))  1
n
(1  )p, p  c(q) :
In particular, there is a strictly positive mark-up p   c(q) in this candidate equilibrium.
However, another possible deviation involves a rm slightly increasing its quality, keeping
its price unchanged, which attracts all the savvy consumers. For it to have no incentive to
do this we require that
1
n
(p  c(q))    + 1
n
(1  ) (p  c(q)), n  1
which is a contradiction.29
We now derive a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.30 In this equilibrium all rms
o¤er the same deterministic price p and choose their quality according to a mixed strategy
which has an atomat q = 0 and is continuously distributed for q  p. (If a rm chooses
q < p, no savvy consumer will ever buy and so the rm should cheatto the maximum
extent and set q = 0.) Thus, this equilibrium exhibits quality but not price dispersion. If
a rm chooses an unexpected price p 6= p, uninformed consumers do not buy from it.31
29This discussion is adapted from Proposition 2 in Cooper and Ross (1984).
30Details for the following analysis are available from the author on request. Dubovik and Janssen
(2012) examine a similar model and issues. However, they assume there are also some totally uninformed
consumers who see neither prices nor qualities and buy randomly. When there are enough such consumers,
they show there is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which rms choose price according to a mixed strategy,
and conditional on its price a rm chooses quality deterministically, so that price is a perfect indicator of
quality.
31For instance, if a rm chooses a lower price p < p, uninformed consumers think its quality is zero,
while if a rm chooses a higher price p > p uninformed consumers believe its average quality is no better
than a rm choosing p = p. In either case, an uninformed consumer does not buy if p 6= p.
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Write the CDF for a rms choice of quality as G(q), which has support f0g[ [p; qmax]
where qmax is the highest quality chosen in this equilibrium. Since a rm must be indi¤erent
between choosing any q in this support, for q  p the CDF G satises 
(G(q))n 1 + 1
n
(1  ) (p   c(q))  1
n
(1  )p ;
which is the counterpart to expression (1) above. (The left-hand side shows that the rm
attracts its share of the uninformed, and sells to all savvy consumers if its quality is above
that of all its rivals. The right-hand side is its prot if it cheats and sets q = 0.)
To make further progress, specialise the model to duopoly with a quadratic cost func-
tion, so that n = 2 and c(q) = 1
2
q2. In this case, using
p =

1 + 
(8)
in the above construction constitutes a valid equilibrium for any 0 <  < 1.32 In this
equilibrium, the probability that a given rm cheats and o¤ers q = 0 is
1  
2(2 + )
(which decreases with ), while the maximum quality o¤ered is
qmax =
2
1 + 
:
This maximum quality is below the e¢ cient quality level (which is 1 in this example) and
allows a rm to break even (i.e., c(qmax)  p). In this equilibrium, industry prot is
() =
(1  )
1 + 
(9)
which is zero at each extreme  = 0 and  = 1. (We have already seen that there is
Bertrand price competition in these cases.) Thus, unlike the models of price dispersion
discussed earlier, here suppliers make low prots when most consumers are non-savvy, since
there is nevertheless competition in terms of price p which acts to dissipate prot. Since
savvy consumers buy the product with the higher quality, rms extract less prot from
them than from an uninformed buyer, and N > S.
The following gure plots the net surplus of each savvy consumer (as the middle curve),
the net surplus of each uninformed consumer (as the lower curve), and total welfare (con-
sumer surplus plus industry prot, plotted as the upper curve in bold). Thus, as in the
32In fact, there is an interval of prices p which constitute this kind of xed priceequilibria, and the
price in (8) is the smallest such price. At the extremes where   0 or   1, the range is very narrow.
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model of price dispersion in section 2.1, each savvy consumer confers a positive search
externality on other consumers. When most consumers are savvy and know the qualities
o¤ered by suppliers, suppliers compete to o¤er an e¢ cient combination of price and qual-
ity, which the uninformed can usually enjoy too. When most consumers cannot discern
quality, a supplier has little incentive to o¤er high quality, and even a savvy consumer is
unlikely to secure a good product in such a market.
The model predicts that competitive rms set a rigid price, but di¤er in their quality
which is only observed by the savvy buyers. Rational but uninformed buyers are put o¤
by a seller which o¤ers a lower price, and presume that such a seller will be cheating
on quality. A market which might t the model is insurance, where a particular kind of
insurance might be o¤ered by rival sellers at a similar price, but di¤erent sellers might have
more exclusionsthan others which only the savvy can notice and avoid.33
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Figure 3: surplus and welfare with quality dispersion
This model, and others like it, is considerably easier to analyze if the non-savvy con-
sumers are strategically naive, and do not make a connection between price and quality.
For instance, suppose that non-savvy consumers anticipate quality qe regardless of the
price asked, and so buy from the rm with the lowest price (provided the price is below
qe). In a competitive market with many (at least four) rms, an asymmetric equilibrium in
33Recall section 2.2, where the imposition of a price cap acted to raise average prices. One could try to
perform a similar exercise in the context of quality dispersion That is, a policy which imposes a minimum
quality standard for products supplied in the market might reduce the incentive for consumers to choose
to become informed about quality, with the net result that average quality falls.
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pure strategies exists of the following form: some rms serve savvy consumers by o¤ering
the e¢ cient level of quality at a price which just covers cost, while other rms serve naive
consumers by o¤ering quality q = 0 at the price which just covers the associated cost (i.e.,
p = 0 since c(0) = 0). In such a market, the proportion of savvy types, , has no impact
on the deals o¤ered to either type of consumer, and savvy types do not protect or harm
the interests of the rest.34 We discuss a closely related model of add-on pricing in section
3.2 in more detail.
3 Hold-up
Amarket exhibits hold upwhen consumers are, to some extent, committed to purchasing
the product before they know the full terms of trade. For instance, if a consumer must make
a costly journey to a seller to discover its price, she might decide to buy even if the price
she nds there was somewhat higher than she anticipated. Likewise, some consumers may
have to decide whether to purchase a product without being able to discern its quality, or
without knowing the prices of add-onproducts which later become available. We discuss
how these markets perform in situations with an indivisible good (section 3.1) and in the
more complex case with add-on pricing (section 3.2).
3.1 An indivisible product
The model of price dispersion in section 2.1 involved a market where most consumers paid
high prices when there were only a few informed consumers present. In hold-up situations,
Diamond (1971) shows how the market can break down altogether. In this section, we see
how the presence of savvy consumers can overcome or amplify this danger, depending on
the precise form of savviness.35
Suppose that a single supplier sells a product with unit cost c to a population of
consumers. Consumers di¤er in their reservation value for the item, v, where the fraction
of consumers with v  p is denoted q(p). Suppose for now that all consumers know their
value v in advance. Crucially, all consumers must incur a travelling cost t > 0 to reach
34Armstrong and Chen (2009) analyze a related model where mixed strategies are used, and nd a
symmetric equilibrium in which rms o¤er random prices and obtain positive prots, and where price is
a perfect indicator of quality, i.e., if a rm chooses a high price it will also choose high quality. However,
the naivete of the uninformed consumers prevents them acting on this indicator. In this equilibrium, the
fraction of savvy types does a¤ect the surplus obtained by the savvy and naive consumers.
35The discussion in this section is related to Stiglitz (1979) and Anderson and Renault (2006).
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the seller. Thus, the type-v consumer will choose to travel to the seller if v  t+ ~p, if she
observes (or expects to pay) price ~p. Suppose a fraction  of consumers (independent of
v) are savvy and know the sellers true price in advance (but still incur the cost t if they
choose to buy), while the remaining 1   have to travel to the seller to discover its price.
These 1   ignorant consumers are rational, though, and anticipate the sellers incentive
to set its price.
The equilibrium price is derived as followed. Suppose that p is the price that an
uninformed consumer expects to pay. If the seller actually chooses the price p, where p is
not too much bigger than than p in the sense that p  p + t, its demand is
q(p+ t) + (1  )q(p + t) :
The informed travel to the seller (and buy) if v  p+ t, while the uninformed travel to the
rm if v  p+t and once at the seller they buy provided that v  p. Thus, similarly to the
model in section 2.1, the demand from the uninformed is inelastic, at least with respect
to local changes around p. Since the rm is free to choose its price p given the price
anticipated by the uninformed consumers, an equilibrium price p is such that choosing
price p = p must
maximizepp+t: (q(p+ t) + (1  )q(p + t)) (p  c) :
This problem has rst-order condition
q(p + t) + (p   c)q0(p + t) = 0 : (10)
If the demand function q() is log-concave, this rst-order condition has a single solution
which determines the equilibrium price p.36
If  = 1, then the equilibrium price is the price that maximizes prot (p   c)q(p + t).
If  = 0, though, so no consumers know the price in advance, no consumer chooses to
travel to the seller, and the market breaks down altogether. The seller knows that every
consumer is willing to pay t more than their anticipated price p for the item, and so it has
an incentive to set its price at least equal to p+ t, and there is no equilibrium price which
induces any consumer to incur the travel cost t. When some consumers are informed in
36Note that the limit of this price as t! 0 is not the price which the rm would charge if there was no
travel cost and all consumers were willing to travel to the rm to nd out its price. (This price would be
the monopoly price which maximizes (p  c)q(p).) Thus, there is a discontinuity in the outcome between
t = 0 and arbitrarily small t > 0.
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advance, though, the market opens, which is to the advantage of both consumers and the
seller.
When q() is log-concave, formula (10) implies that the equilibrium price is a decreasing
function of . Therefore, all consumers savvy and uninformed benet when  rises.
Since the equilibrium price p is above the monopoly price that maximizes (p  c)q(p+ t),
and this prot (p  c)q(p+ t) is single-peaked in p, it follows that the rm too is better o¤
when  is larger. Thus, this market provides an example where the search externality is
present, and where boosting the fraction of savvy types benets all parties.37 (By contrast,
in section 2.1 industry prots were decreasing in the fraction of informed consumers.)
Contrasting e¤ects are seen if some consumers know their value v in advance rather than
the price. Suppose that no consumer knows the price in advance, so the danger of hold-up
is present. However, a fraction  of consumers are savvy in the sense that they know their
value v in advance, while the remaining 1  consumers only discover their valuation once
they travel to the seller and inspect the product. (These uninformed consumers view the
distribution of uncertain values to be governed by the function q.)
An uninformed consumer who expects to pay price p will travel to the seller if expected
surplus is greater than their travel cost, i.e., if t  s(p), where
s(p) 
Z 1
p
q(~p)d~p ; (11)
is net consumer surplus (the area under the demand curve) with price p. Informed
consumers, by contrast, will travel to the seller if t  v   p. Provided that s(p)  t, the
sellers demand when it chooses price p  p + t is
q(p + t) + (1  )q(p) ;
since all uninformed consumers travel to the seller, and they will buy if they discover that
v  p. Thus, now the informed consumers have locally inelastic demand. An equilibrium
price p is such that choosing p = p must
maximizepp+t: (q(p + t) + (1  )q(p)) (p  c) ;
which has rst-order condition
q(p + t) + (1  )q(p) + (1  )(p   c)q0(p) = 0 : (12)
37As in section 2.2, therefore, prots can be increased if a price cap is imposed, albeit for a very di¤erent
reason. In the current context, a price cap operates to commit the rm not to set high prices.
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Following similar arguments to those used when some consumers knew the price in ad-
vance, when q is log-concave, the rst-order condition for this problem uniquely determines
the candidate equilibrium price, but now this price p increases with . When  = 0, the
candidate price is the monopoly price pM which maximizes (p  c)q(p), while when  = 1
the candidate price is such that q(p + t) = 0. If the requirement s(p)  t fails, the un-
informed have no incentive to participate, and when this happens the market shuts down.
When the travel cost t is so large that t > s(pM), the uninformed will not travel to the
rm even in the most favorable case when  = 0. However, if t < s(pM), then the market
opens if  is su¢ ciently small (and fails when  is close enough to 1).
In the range of  where the market opens, the equilibrium price increases with , and
all consumers as well as the rm are worse o¤ with larger . When the market is open,
savvy consumers obtain a higher surplus than the uninformed, since a consumer would
prefer to know her valuation before deciding to travel to the rm. (Expected surplus of
a savvy consumer is VS = s(p + t), while expected surplus of an uninformed consumer
is VN = s(p)   t, which is smaller.) Since demand from the uninformed, q(p), is higher
than from the informed, q(p + t), the rm obtains more prot from the non-savvy, and
N > S.
To illustrate, in the linear demand example where q(p) = 1   p and c = 0, the price
which solves (12) is
p =
1  t
2   : (13)
At this price, the requirement that s(p)  t is never satised when t  s(pM) = 1
8
, in
which case the market shuts down. If t < 1
8
, however, the market is open if the fraction of
informed consumers  is su¢ ciently small.38 In this example, aggregate consumer surplus
V and prots  both decrease with , and hence welfare does too.
Using the terminology of section 1, in formal terms this market exhibits a ripo¤ ex-
ternality.39 Uninformed consumers may be willing to invest in travelling to the seller to
discover their valuation, for the chance they like the product, and this helps the market
remain open.40 However, despite the fact that N() > S(), it is perhaps misleading to
38The precise condition is that   1 2
p
2t
1 p2t t .
39Using similar analysis to that in section 2.2 one could investigate the equilibrium proportion of savvy
consumers, when a consumer can choose to become informed of her valuation ex ante by incurring a cost
. Because a ripo¤ externality operates in this market, we expect that too many consumers choose to
become informed in equilibrium.
40See Anderson and Renault (2000) for related analysis in a duopoly model. In that model, the price-
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say that the uninformed consumers are being ripped o¤. Unlike the market described
in the next section, the seller here is not engaging in any tactic which aims to exploit this
group of consumers.
3.2 Add-on pricing
Hold-up can also occur when a seller supplies an add-onproduct once a consumer has
purchased the initial coreproduct. Familiar examples of this phenomenon include: the
minibar inside a hotel room; toner cartridges once one has purchased a printer; after-sales
care for your new car; an extended warranty for your new television; the ability to obtain
a casual overdraft from your bank without prior agreement, or the ability to have your
luggage stored in the aircrafts hold in the event it is deemed slightly too large for the
cabin.
In some of these examples, it may be that the rm does not choose its add-on price
until the customer has purchased the core product, in which case the rm is tempted to
set monopoly prices for these services. In other cases, though, the rm chooses both prices
at the same time, and the issue is not one of lack of commitment. Rather, the problem
is that some consumers either do not observe the rms choice of add-on price, or can
observe it but do not think it will apply to them. In this section we explore these cases
where rms choose both prices simultaneously, but some consumers cannot, or do not,
take adequate notice of the add-on price. Three variants are discussed: the rst where
non-savvy consumers are rational, but cannot see or interpret the add-on price; a second
where naive consumers do not foresee their demand for the add-on service, and a third
where naive consumers can be tricked into paying for add-ons they dont want. Perhaps
surprisingly, these apparently small changes in model assumptions generate all three of the
market scenarios listed in section 1.
Rational but uninformed consumers: Here we assume that some consumers have prohibitive
costs for reading and/or understanding the small-printin the contract to discover terms
for add-ons, although they do care about these terms. (More generally, the following
discussion is isomorphic to a model in which rms choose the quality of their product, and
only a fraction of consumers are able to discern quality directly.)
raising impact of savvy consumers acts to boost industry prot, in contrast to the monopoly case where
the equilibrium price is too high from the sellers perspective.
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A single seller supplies a core product, for which consumers have heterogeneous value
X. The price of this product is denoted P and its unit cost is C. The fraction of consumers
with X  P is denoted Q(P ). Once a consumer has purchased this core product, an add-
on product becomes available. The price of this product is p and its unit cost is c. All
consumers have the same add-on demand, and with price p a consumer will consume q(p)
units of the add-on service.41 Write (p)  (p   c)q(p) for the add-on prot with price
p, and pM for the price which maximizes this prot. The expected net surplus from the
option of being able to buy the add-on at price p is s(p) in (11). Thus, if a consumer with
valuation X anticipates (or observes) the add-on price ~p, she will buy the core product if
X + s(~p)  P : (14)
If she does buy the core product, she will go on to generate add-on prot (p), where p is
the rms true add-on price.
Suppose a fraction  of consumers observe the rms true add-on price, while the
remaining 1    do not. If the uninformed expect to pay add-on price p, the rms
expected prot from the two groups of consumers is
(Q(P   s(p)) + (1  )Q(P   s(p))) (P   C + (p)) : (15)
Let (P ; p) denote the equilibrium pair of prices. If we assume passive conjectures, unin-
formed consumers anticipate the add-on price p even if they observe an unexpected core
price P 6= P .42 For these prices to constitute an equilibrium, choosing (P; p) = (P ; p)
maximizes (over any pair of prices P and p) the expression (15). The two rst-order
conditions for this problem are
Q(P    s(p)) +Q0(P    s(p)) fP    C + (p)g = 0 ;
Q(P    s(p))0(p) + q(p)Q0(P    s(p)) fP    C + (p)g = 0 :
41This elastic demand for the add-on service could be generated if each consumer has a unit demand
for the add-on, with incremental valuation v, and the probability that v is above p is q(p). With this
interpretation, the realization of v is not known to the consumer (even a savvy consumer) until after she
buys the core product, and is independently distributed from X.
42When some consumers see one dimension of a sellers choice but not another, this raises the issue of
how such a consumer forms her expectation of the unobserved variable given what she does observe. If
she observes the rms core price but not its add-on price, what does she infer about the likely add-on
price from the core price? We take the simplest approach and suppose that the uninformed consumers
have passive conjectures, in that they hold beliefs about the rms add-on price which must be fullled
in equilibrium, but these beliefs are not a¤ected if a rm deviates from the anticipated core price.
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Eliminating terms in P  reveals that the add-on price satises 0(p) = q(p), or
(1  )q(p) + (p   c)q0(p) = 0 ; (16)
which has a similar form to the earlier expression (10). Thus, when  = 1, the add-on
price is at its e¢ cient level p = c, while when  = 0 the add-on price is the monopoly
price pM which maximizes (p). More generally, when add-on demand q() is log-concave,
formula (16) implies that the add-on price is a decreasing function of . For example, when
q(p) = 1  p and c = 0, the add-on price is p = 1 
2  .
It is straightforward to show that consumers and the rm are worse-o¤ when the equi-
librium add-on price is higher, i.e., when  is smaller.43 Thus, this market exhibits search
externalities of the strong kind where all parties are better o¤ when the fraction of in-
formed consumers rises. In this it is like the hold-up model with an indivisible product
discussed above.
This discussion implicitly assumed that the seller had to o¤er the same add-on terms
to all its customers, which seems a reasonable assumption in most contexts. (It is hard to
imagine a hotel supplying rooms with di¤erent minibar prices, for instance.) If feasible,
though, the seller has an incentive to set di¤erent add-on terms: an e¢ cient price p = c
aimed at the savvy, and a monopolistic price p = pM aimed at the non-savvy. (The non-
savvy might accidently choose the e¢ cient contract, but this probability could be reduced
if the seller somehow o¤ered the monopolistic contract, together with a hard-to-nd
e¢ cient contract which only the savvy could locate.) The fact that the seller o¤ers the
same deal to all consumers immediately implies that VS = VN and S = N .
This framework with rational but uninformed consumers is hard to extend to compet-
itive environments, except in the extreme cases where  = 0 or  = 1.44 The model with
quality dispersion in section 2.4 has this avour, and could presumably be re-interpreted as
a model of add-on pricing after suitable adjustments. Much easier to analyze, and arguably
43To see this, write Y = P   s(p) for the total pricefor the core product. Then consumers are better
o¤when Y is smaller. For given equilibrium add-on price p, the rm chooses the core price P to maximize
Q(P   s(p))(P  C + (p)), i.e., it chooses the total price Y to maximize Q(Y )(Y  C +w(p)), where
w(p)  s(p) + (p) is total add-on surplus with add-on price p. The function w(p) is decreasing for p  c.
Since Y maximizes Q(Y )(Y   C + w), a higher w (i.e., a lower p) is like the monopolist having a lower
cost, which induces a lower Y and higher optimal prots.
44Ellison (2005) presents a Hotelling-style duopoly model of add-on pricing. He analyzes two games: one
where the two rms reveal both of their prices ex ante and another where neither rm reveals its add-on
price until consumers buy the core product. Using the current notation, these two cases correspond to
 = 1 and  = 0 respectively. In his model, industry prots are higher when no consumer is informed of
add-on prices, in contrast to the monopoly case just presented.
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more applicable in some contexts, are variants when the non-savvy are strategically naive
rather than rational. We discuss two such variants in the remainder of this section.
Naive consumers do not foresee need for add-on product : This version of the add-on pricing
problem supposes that non-savvy consumers simply do not anticipate their future demand
for the add-on service. These consumers might observe the add-on price, but do not regard
it as relevant to them.
In more detail, the savvy consumers continue to purchase the core product according
to the optimal rule in (14), while naive consumers purchase myopically, i.e., when X  P .
These naive consumers under-estimate the value of the core product, and buy too rarely.
(For example, a naive consumer when choosing a hotel room overlooks the benets of having
the minibar in the room.) Nevertheless, once they have purchased the core product, they
go on to generate prots (p) for the supplier. This framework can be analyzed in a
monopoly or competitive context. The latter is somewhat more transparent, and we focus
on that case.45
Suppose that many (more than four) sellers compete for consumers by o¤ering a pair
of prices (P; p), where P is a sellers price for the core product and p is its price for the
add-on. Savvy consumers foresee their likely future demand, and so buy from a seller with
the lowest total price P   s(p), provided their valuation X is above this total price.
Naive consumers buy from a seller with the lowest core product price P , provided their X
is above this price.
An asymmetric equilibrium with pure strategies takes the following form. Some sellers
o¤er an e¢ cient contract aimed at savvy consumers, which has (P; p) = (C; c). Other
45The case of monopoly is analyzed as follows. As in the previous version of the add-on pricing problem,
suppose that the rm o¤ers the same contract, denoted (P; p), to all its customers. Similarly to (15), the
sellers prot is then (Q(P   s(p)) + (1  )Q(P )) (P   C + (p)). Note that the prot from a savvy
consumer here is greater than that from a naive consumer, i.e., S > N , since naive consumers are less
inclined to buy the core product. (This contrasts with our analysis of the Coase model in section 2.3,
where naive consumers also purchased myopically but where S < N , since in the Coase model the two
products were substitutes, while in this add-on model the core product and the add-on are complements.)
As such, the rm has an incentive to educate its customers, if feasible, in the sense that it wishes to
convince naive consumers that they will, in fact, gain value from the add-on service.
One can check that the rst-order condition for the optimal add-on price is
0(p)
q(p)
=
Q0(P    s(p))
Q0(P    s(p)) + (1  )Q0(P ))
which is a less neat formula than the rational version in (16) which entailed 0=q = . However, in
the special case where core product demand Q is linear, the two rst-order conditions coincide, and the
equilibrium add-on price is exactly the same with rational and with naive consumers.
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sellers o¤er an ine¢ cient contract aimed at the naive which takes a bargain-then-ripo¤
(or loss-leader) form. Specically, the naive contract has a monopoly add-on price pM
and a subsidized core product price which just enables a rm to break even, so that
P   C + (pM) = 0. This contract is not attractive to savvy forward-looking consumers,
who prefer the cost-reective tari¤, but is attractive to the naive who do not foresee their
future demand for the add-on. There is therefore price dispersion in the market, both for
the core product and for the add-on. These contracts do not depend on the fraction of
savvy types present in the market, and there are no externalities between the two groups
of consumers.
Similarly to (11), write
S(P ) 
Z 1
P
Q( ~P )d ~P
for consumer surplus from the core product alone when its price is P . Then the average
surplus of a savvy consumer in this market is VS = S(C   s(c)), while the truesurplus
of a naive consumer with add-on price p is
VN = S(C   (p)) +Q(C   (p))s(p) : (17)
(To understand this expression, note that the core product price is P = C   (p) when
the add-on price is p, and so a consumer buys if X  C   (p), which yields core product
surplus S(C   (p)). A naive consumer who buys the core product will, in fact, go on to
consume the add-on product, and obtain surplus from this product equal to s(p), which
explains the second term in the above expression.) The convexity of S() together with the
fact that s(c)  s(p) + (p) for any price p implies that VS  VN .
This model predicts that naive consumers end up paying high add-on prices. As in
section 2.2, regulators might consider controlling suppliersfreedom to exploit consumers in
this fashion. However, there are two market failures operating in the laissez-faire market
naive consumers pay too much for the add-on, and they buy the core product too rarely
and while high add-on prices are the cause of the rst problem they mitigate the second
by funding a subsidized core product price. As such, controlling the maximum permitted
add-on price may have mixed e¤ects on the naive consumers. (This regulation has no
impact on the surplus enjoyed by savvy consumers.) In technical terms, naive surplus in
(17) is not necessarily decreasing in p, and regulation to limit ripo¤smight harm rather
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than benet these consumers.46 ;47
There are other situations where the presence of savvy consumers has no signicant
impact on the deals o¤ered to the naive, and vice versa. For example, some consumers
might not believe in the predictive power of horoscopes and ignore this market altogether,
while others are willing to pay for this service. Unless there are strong scale economy e¤ects
(so that having large numbers of credulous consumers allows astrologers to operate more
e¢ ciently), there is no interaction between the two groups of consumers. More generally,
many scamsprey on the naive but have little impact on the savvy.
The phenomenon can also be seen in competitive insurance markets where some con-
sumers are over-optimistic (or over-pessimistic) about the likelihood of the bad outcome.48
Alternatively, naive consumers might be over-optimistic about how often they will go to
an exercise gym. Such consumers may prefer a lump-sum membership, which is (wrongly)
perceived to be good valueby the optimistic consumer. A savvy consumer who accu-
rately estimates her demand prefer a pay-per-visit contract, and neither type of consumer
wishes to use the tari¤ aimed at the other type. Similar e¤ects arise in situations where
agents have self-control problems, and where savvy agents foresee this in advance and naive
agents do not.49
These various situations all share the same basic structure. The market is competi-
tive, and so supplier prots are driven to zero. All consumers ultimately exhibit the same
behaviour and cause the same costs when faced with a given contract, and so the set of
contracts which are consistent with zero prots are the same for a naive as for a savvy
consumer. From this set, suppliers in equilibrium choose the contract which is most at-
tractive ex ante to the target consumer, and so by construction, neither type is tempted
46To illustrate, suppose that Q(P ) = 1  P , q(p) = 1  p, C = 34 and c = 0. The tari¤ aimed at naives
in the unregulated market can be calculated to be P = p = 12 , which induces naive surplus VN =
3
16 . If
regulation forced the add-on price down to cost, so that p = 0, the core product price rises to P = 34 , and
naives have reduced surplus VN = 532 .
47Other natural ways to model the add-on pricing problem do not have this feature, however. For
example, suppose that (very) naive consumers do not realize that toner cartridges are needed to use a
printer, and so buy a printer assuming they can print as much as they wish without further outlay. Once
they purchase the printer, though, they realize they do face on-going add-on charges, and their perceived
add-on surplus falls from s(0) to s(p) with add-on price p. In this situation, naive consumers buy the core
product too often, rather than too rarely, and this makes a reduction in the add-on price unambiguously
benecial to these consumers. In technical terms, the naive surplus in this situation is modied from (17)
to VN = S(C   (p)) +Q(C   (p))(s(p)  s(0)), which is always decreasing in p for p between cost c and
the monopoly price pM .
48See Sandroni and Squintani (2007) for a model along these lines.
49See DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) and Spiegler (2011, section 2.3) for further discussion.
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by the contract aimed at the other group. The outcome is therefore is as if a consumers
savviness or naivete was known to suppliers, and there is no interaction between the two
groups.
Bill shock : The previous variant could be viewed as a model of hidden benets, in
the sense that naive consumers under-estimated how much they will value the service.
The nal variant we consider, by contrast, is model with hidden costs. Here, naive
consumers mistakenly buy an add-on service which they do not particularly want or need,
a phenomenon sometimes known as bill shock.50 In this situation, the core price is
subsidized with the prots generated by the fraction of naive consumers who end up paying
for unwanted add-ons, and this benets the savvy consumers.
Examples of the kind of add-on servicewe have in mind are as follows. Some airlines
charge for carrying excess luggage, for checking-in luggage, or for checking in at the airport
rather than online.51 Savvy consumers are aware that these charges will be levied unless
they take care in advance, while naive consumers will pay these charges if they turn up
at the airport unprepared. Similarly, banks or credit card companies levy charges for
unauthorized overdrafts or late payment. By being aware of their nances, savvy consumers
can avoid these charges, while naive consumers might not be aware of the circumstances
in which these charges can be levied.52 Mobile phone contracts usually allow a specied
number of calls per month, but if the subscriber makes more calls than this she pays an
overagecharge. Naive consumers who do not pay attention to their monthly usage or
the possibility that they may need more than the monthly allowance may get caught out
in a contract with high overage charges.53
50Gabaix and Laibson (2006) is perhaps the rst and most prominent paper which discusses this phe-
nomenon. Their approach di¤ers slightly from that presented here. They suppose that a rm decides
whether to advertise or to shroud its add-on price. When a rm advertises its price, this acts as an
eye-opener and consumers realize they will need to pay the charge unless they take evasive action in
advance. If rms decide to shroud, they will choose monopolistic terms for the add-on. Savvy consumers
anticipate this incentive, and take evasive action, while naive types do not. In many cases, an equilibrium
exists in which all rms shroud their add-on price, and naive consumers end up paying it.
51At the time of writing, Ryanair charges £ 70 to check in at the airport. See www.ryanair.com/en/fees
for details (visited 21 May, 2014).
52Armstrong and Vickers (2012) discuss unauthorized overdraft fees in the UK. In the UK bank market
only a minority of consumers pay such fees (which were an average of £ 23 per item in 2006), and these
fees help fund the free if in creditmodel enjoyed by the majority of other consumers. (In 2006, about
30% of current account revenue came from these charges.) About 75% of account holders did not pay
these fees, while 1.4 million customers paid more than £ 500 in such fees in 2006. The great majority of
customers say they do not consider the level of these charges when choosing their bank, and few of those
who paid these charges in 2006 anticipated having to pay these charges beforehand.
53See Grubb (2014) for analysis of this form of bill shock, and the possible interventions to overcome
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Similar e¤ects are seen in other scenarios. For instance, naive consumers might be
susceptible to persuasion to buy a useless add-on. When a consumer buys a new television,
a salesman may suggest he also buys an extended warranty to go with it. If the television
is so reliable that the warranty actually has no value, the cost of the warranty is pure loss
to the consumer and pure prot to the seller. Savvy consumers know the warranty has
no value, or are otherwise immune to the salesmans patter, and do not buy. In addition,
such practices as teaser rates and roll-over contracts can be interpreted in a similar
manner. Suppose that sellers supply a product over time, and the price for the rst periods
consumption is lower than for subsequent consumption. A savvy consumer might cancel
her contract after one period (and perhaps enjoy another teaser rate from a new supplier),
while a naive consumer forgets to cancel or is unaware that her contract will automatically
be rolled-over into the next period. This analysis is consistent with marketing tactics such
as a bank o¤ering a relatively high interest rate on a savings account for the rst year,
which drops o¤ sharply thereafter, or a magazine o¤ering a cheap trial period.54
To model these situations, consider the following stylized framework. Two or more
rms supply a product, the cost of which is C and the price of which is P . A fraction  of
consumers are savvy and pay only this price P . The remaining 1   consumers are naive,
and can be tricked into making an extra payment R > 0 to their chosen seller once they
have purchased the core product. This extra payment might be generated via small-print
trapsor worthless add-ons, which savvy consumers know how to avoid. If sellers cannot
distinguish the two kinds of consumers in advance, the equilibrium outcome in this market
is for the core product to be subsidized by the anticipated rents from the naive, so that
P = C   (1  )R : (18)
A savvy consumer pays only this bargain price, while a naive consumer pays the bargain
price followed by the ripo¤ R, which comes to C + R in total. Thus, both types of
consumer pay more when  is larger.
As before, a consumer has idiosyncratic valuation X for the product, Q(P ) is the
proportion of consumers with X  P and S(P ) measures consumer surplus from the
product (without ripo¤s) when price is P . The average surplus of a savvy consumer in
the problem.
54Interestingly, the prominent consumer rights body in the UK, Which?, employs this tactic. One can
sign up for one months service for just £ 1, which is automatically rolled-over for £ 10.75 each month until
cancelled. See www.which.co.uk/signup for further details (visited 21 May 2014).
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this market is then VS() = S(C   (1  )R), which decreases with  and so this market
exhibits ripo¤ externalities.55 The (true) surplus of a naive consumer is
VN() = S(C   (1  )R) RQ(C   (1  )R)
since a naive consumer buys just as often as a savvy type, but ends up paying an extra R if
she does buy. In general it is ambiguous whether or not VN decreases with . However, if R
is not too large or demand Q is not too elastic, VN will, like VS, decrease with . However,
aggregate consumer surplus, V () = VS() + (1   )VN(), which equals total welfare
in this competitive market, unambiguously increases with  due to the larger number of
consumers who enjoy the higher surplus VS.
Aggregate consumer surplus V () always falls with R, and so there is scope for welfare-
improving regulation which constrains the size of the ripo¤. However, the impact of such
regulation on the two groups of consumers di¤ers: a savvy type benets from a rms
ability to ripo¤ the naive and so would like R to be large, while a naive consumers surplus
VN decreases with R. As such, the two groups have opposing interests towards regulation
to limit ripo¤s, and savvy types might lobby against this welfare-enhancing regulation.56
4 Conclusions
This paper has explored how the balance of savvy and non-savvy consumers in a
market a¤ects rm behaviour and the deals o¤ered to consumers. We discussed two ways
in which the two groups might interact: the case of search externalities, where savvy
consumers help the non-savvy to obtain a good deal, and the case of ripo¤ externalities,
where non-savvy consumers enable the savvy to obtain a good deal.
We restricted our attention to two broad kinds of market: those which exhibit price
or quality dispersion (section 2) and those involving forms of hold-up (section 3). All of
the markets examined in section 2 involved a search externality, and the presence of savvy
consumers protected the interests of non-savvy consumers. In the model of oligopoly price
55It is straightforward to analyze the monopoly version of this market. If the monopolist chooses price
P , its prot is Q(P )  (P   C + (1   )R). Thus, the most protable price is a decreasing function of
(1 )R, so that savvy consumers, as well as the rm itself, are better o¤ when  is smaller or R is larger.
56If R is large enough, the price in (18) is negative. If a negative price is not feasible, the outcome is
then that the product is o¤ered for free, and the rms costs are covered entirely by exploiting the naive.
(For instance, in the UK the core bank account is typically free.) Firms then have no way to dissipate
prots, and prots will be positive even in a competitive market. In these cases, rms as well as savvy
consumers have an incentive to lobby against constraints on ripo¤s.
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dispersion in section 2.1, this was because savvy consumers shopped around for the lowest
price and their demand was more elastic. As such, savvy consumers induced lower prices
in equilibrium, so that industry prots fell with  while overall welfare increased. Because
prots fall with the fraction of savvy types, rms have an incentive to try to confuse
consumers in the way they present their o¤ers, and they may welcome regulation which
reduces the incentive for consumers to become savvy (section 2.2).
The model with quality dispersion in section 2.4 behaved in a broadly similar manner.
There, savviness reected a consumers ability to discern product quality, and greater num-
bers of these consumers increased a rms incentive to o¤er an appropriate level of quality,
which the non-savvy could also enjoy. The fact that the uninformed were nevertheless ra-
tional, and understood a sellers incentive to cut quality and supply only the uninformed,
implied that the equilibrium involved a quality assuringrigid price above cost. In this
market, then, there was quality, but not price, dispersion. The savvy obtained higher
surplus, and generated lower prots, than the uninformed consumers. A major contrast to
the model with price dispersion, though, was that industry prot was non-monotonic in
, and prots were low even when few savvy types were present. This was because rms
have two strategic variables, price and quality, and all consumers observe prices. As such,
there was vigorous competition when most consumers were non-savvy.
In the Coasian variant in section 2.3, there was intra-rm price dispersion, and savvy
consumers who understood the sellers incentive to reduce price over time intensied the
rms incentives to compete against its earlier self, which benetted the naive. However,
because savvy consumers exerted their positive externality by following a socially ine¢ cient
strategy namely, waiting to buy later their presence could reduce welfare overall.
The models of hold-up in section 3 presented a more mixed picture, and small changes
in the model could swing the market from one with search externalities to one with ripo¤
externalities. This was seen most transparently in section 3.1, where a monopolist supplied
an indivisible product and consumers incurred a sunk cost to travel to the seller. If savvy
consumers knew the rms price in advance, while non-savvy consumers had to travel to
the seller to discover its price, the former were more price-sensitive. Thus, as in section 2.1,
the price decreases with , and the search externality benets the non-savvy and boosts
overall welfare. However, with hold-up the supplier cannot refrain from setting a high
price to exploit uninformed consumers, and the equilibrium price is too high even from the
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sellers perspective. As such, the price reduction caused by savvy consumers increased the
sellers prots in this market.
However, if a savvy consumer knew her valuation for the product in advance, while non-
savvy consumers had to travel to the seller to see how much they liked the product, the
latter were the consumers with more elastic demand. (Neither group of consumers knew
the price in advance, and so the savvy consumers had demand which was inelastic with
respect to small price rises. The uninformed, however, travelled to the seller in any event,
to see if they liked the product, and so their demand could respond to out-of-equilibrium
price changes.) In this case, price was an increasing function of . The presence of non-
savvy consumers protected the interests of the savvy, i.e., there was what we termed a
ripo¤ externality. Indeed, too large a fraction of savvy types caused the market to break
down altogether.
In section 3.2, three variants of a market with add-on pricing were discussed. Consumers
initially decide whether to buy a core product, and if they did so, they were subsequently
o¤ered a complementary product. The rst variant involved a monopoly seller, and savvy
consumers knew the add-on price in advance. Non-savvy consumers did not know this
price when deciding to buy the core product, but were rational and understood the rms
incentive to hold them up with a high add-on price. As with the model in section 2.4,
the presence of savvy types gave the seller an incentive to set reasonably e¢ cient add-on
terms, and the market involved a search externality.
In a second variant, the non-savvy were strategically naive in the sense that they did
not foresee their future demand for the add-on product. This myopic perspective led them
to purchase the core product too rarely. In a competitive market, there was dispersion in
both the core price and the add-on price. Some sellers o¤ered an e¢ cient cost-based tari¤
aimed at the savvy who understood they would need the add-on service, while other sellers
o¤ered a bargain-then-ripo¤tari¤with a subsidized core product price and monopolistic
terms for the add-on. This contract was more attractive to naive consumers, since they
myopically believed the low price for the core product was good value. In this market,
there were no externalities between the two groups of consumers in either direction. Policy
which constrained a sellers ability to set high add-on prices had ambiguous e¤ects on the
surplus of naive consumers. (It had no impact on savvy surplus.) High add-on prices fund
the subsidized price for the core product, and this helps overcome the market failure caused
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by these consumers buying the core product too rarely.
The nal model involved bill shock, where naive consumers could be tricked into
making extra payments, while savvy consumers could defend themselves against these
tactics. (These tricks might involve penalty charges for errant behaviour, persuasion to buy
useless add-ons, or rollover contracts which savvy consumers know to cancel.) Competing
sellers set the price for the core product in anticipation that a consumer might be naive
and generate extra revenue. As such, the core price was subsidized, with a greater subsidy
when the fraction of non-savvy types was larger. Savvy consumers therefore benet from
the presence of the naive, and a ripo¤ externality was present. Overall welfare decreases
with the ability to exploit naive consumers. Regulation to constrain ripo¤s may therefore
be e¢ cient, but will harm the savvy types who prey on the naive consumers when they
fall into small-print traps.
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